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TREATY-BASED FEDERALISM, A.D. 1979:
A GLOSS ON COVEY T. OLIVER AT THE
HAGUE ACADEMY
ERIc STIN t

It is next to absurd for one not more than a few months
Oliver's junior to participate in a tribute for a man who willfully
-without any apparent reason--chose to retire early from teaching,
an act tantamount to desertion under fire. Still, it is comforting
that I am asked to praise, not to bury, a close professional associate
and an even closer friend of some thirty years. A scholar, teacher,
diplomat, Oliver has been a commanding figure, combining superb
erudition and unique professional experience with a warm, outgoing personality and an irresistible, down-to-earth sense of humor.
While profoundly concerned with the "universal normative
order" as the underpinning of the global system, Oliver has been
attracted by the emerging regional subsystems and their regional
orders: Latin America, the backyard of his youth to which he returned as his country's envoy, and Western Europe. He has been
interested in post-World War Europe for two reasons: first, as a
target of the American entrepreneur and his legal advisor, because,
to quote his inimitable yet typical remark at the 1977 ABA National Institute, "[I]t is not perfect, but the European Economic
Community area is still the best piano player United States direct
foreign investment can find, this little old world 'round"; and second, because he has recognized the evolving new public law of
Europe as the most advanced transnational legal order, an inspiration-despite its serious tensions and contradictions-if not a model,
for other regions of this planet.
I should like to reflect here briefly on this latter interest in
Europe, relying on the lectures that Oliver delivered at the Hague
Academy of International Law, entitled The Enforcement of Treaties by a Federal State.'
Although this attractive bouquet of lectures focused on a comparative analysis of federal treaty enforcement systems, it raised
some fundamental questions about the status of modern federalism.
Specifically, Oliver explored whether or not federalism is "declining," whether there is such a thing as a treaty-based federation and
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whether it is legitimate to classify the European Community as "an
incipient," or "semi- or, perhaps, meta-federal structure for governance"? These questions were asked-and answered-more than
five years ago, a substantial segment of time in our era of change.
Have Oliver's answers stood the test of time?
A. Federalism Declining?
Out of some 140 (now some 160) entities recognized as states,
Oliver observes, not more than a dozen are federal in form. "[N]o
independent observer has been found who would classify the Soviet
Union as a functioning federalism," 2 and there is "substantial
doubt" on this score concerning the Federal Republic of Brazil
and other socialist and non-socialist federations which are also essentially "de facto unitary States." 3 The list of formally federal
states that do have realistic claims to being functioning federal
structures is thus reduced to a handful: Australia, Austria, Canada,
the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Malaysia, Switzerland,
and the United States. Oliver suggests, however, two additional
dimensions: "(i) the partial federation known as the European Communities and (ii) the possibilities for federalism as the road to regionalism elsewhere." 4 While federalism "may not be growingindeed may be declining-in national State systems, it is growing and
probably will continue to grow in regional systems and thus to be a
major means for evolution beyond the present structure of the
world community." 5
Today, the diagnosis of the state of federalism must be, if anything, even more tentative. Admittedly, the trend toward increased
centralization has continued in the Federal Republic of Germany
and-it has been generally assumed-in the United States as well.
However, federal revenue-sharing legislation has increased the financial clout of the states, and the current political rhetoric directed
against the remote central government and its bureaucracy has
brought about some loosening of federal controls over regulated
industries. There has also been a certain resurgence of regional
feelings and solidarity, and some support for allowing the states a
greater margin of freedom in matters of strong local or regional
interest. In 1976, for the first time since the early New Deal era,
the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated the application
21d. 346.
31d. 347.
4Id. 348.
5Id.
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of a regulatory act of Congress to state government activities as an
unconstitutional intrusion on state sovereignty." But it would be
most improvident to view this five-to-four decision as a swallow
heralding a new summer for judicial federalism in this country.
In fact, persistent demands for additional health, education, and
welfare services, for consumer and environmental protection, and
for industrial subsidies have resulted in still further centralization
and more bureaucracy. Apart from the exasperation with the overgrown central bureaucracy, the primary issue of the day in the
American federal system has been the power contest between the
federal Congress and the post-imperial Presidency, rather than a
question of federal against state power. Overbureaucratization, we
may note in passing, is perhaps accentuated by, but is certainly not
confined to, federal structures. In the neighboring Canadian federation, putting aside the worst-case scenario of disintegration, the
trend surely does not point away from some form of federalism if
the country is to remain a viable nation-state.
In Europe, remarkable mutations are taking place in some of
the archetypal unitary states which may portend a greater role for
federalist patterns in the future. In Italy, the "regions," which
until recently were little more than a constitutional mirage, have
now been given a firm statutory basis, and regional assemblies have
been elected whose legislation is subject to review by a central judiciary. Belgium is galloping toward a federal framework that is apparently viewed as the only system capable of containing the linguistic problem. In France, the Napoleonic centralism is subject to
considerable stress by regional interests ranging from Brittany to
Corsica, and by a growing demand for increased local participation
in governance-a trend manifested not only in politics, but also in
economic life and in education. Evidence of similar pressures has
appeared in the new Spain as well. However, perhaps the most
unexpected developments have occurred in the United Kingdom,
where the Dicey-fostered (if not manufactured) myth of "parliamentary sovereignty" has been under some stress in the face of new
realities. No lesser authority than Lord (then Lord Justice) Scarman has raised the need for a "new constitutional settlement" that
would assure in Britain the continued observance and normative
superiority of the European Community legal order and also the
enforcement of the European Bill of Rights, accepted by the United
Kingdom in the European Convention on Human Rights with its
transnational institutions, the Commission and the Court of Human
6
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Rights. Last but not least, the currently debated "devolution" of
power from Westminster to Scotland and possibly to Wales may
mark the end of the classic United Kingdom structure and would
require an umpiring function between the central and regional
authorities. Lord Scarman's solution would include "entrenched
provisions (including a Bill of Rights)" and a "Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom charged with the duty of protecting the Constitution." 7
If federalism in mature federations reveals a continuing accretion of central regulatory authority, it is in a sense paradoxical to
see in the United Kingdom, as well as in Belgium and Italy, a reallocation of power from national governments to subnational
regions. The just mentioned European transnational arrangements
also reduce or restrain national power, in favor, however, of the new
transnational institutions. Clearly, complex and often conflicting
forces are at work here. It should become clearer by the end of
this century whether, in this tri-level perspective, the traditional
"sovereign" nation-state system will be replaced in Europe by a
structure of a still undetermined shape, marked by a heavier reliance on the ethnically, linguistically, or economically based regions
on one hand, and the transnational institutions on the other.
B. Treaty-Based Federalism
Another fistful of nettles grasped by Oliver is the question
whether there is such a thing as a treaty-based federalism. For whatever it may be worth, one may recall the argument that, concurrent with the separation from Great Britain, the thirteen states in
North America were "in a state of Nature toward each other," and
the Union was formed by a "compact" among them rather than by a
constitution written by the "people." The Supreme Court rejected
the "compact" doctrine in McCulloch v. Maryland,8 and later again
in the context of Justice Sutherland's fanciful theory of external
sovereignty.9 One may speculate, however, whether the course of
federalism in the United States would have been significantly different-all other factors remaining equal-if the "compact" view of
the formation of the Union had been generally accepted.
A more fruitful line of inquiry is the problem whether the
European Community, which is exclusively treaty-based, may be
ENGLISH LAw-Tim NEW DIMENSION 27, 81 (1974).
8 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
7 LoRD Sc~rM=A,

9 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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legitimately viewed as an incipient federal structure. Although the
final returns obviously are not in as yet, it is probably safe to sayat the risk of ruffling some positivist-formalist feathers-that from a
strictly normative viewpoint it has made little difference that the
Community was established by a network of treaties rather than
by a formal constitution. This is due primarily to the impact of the
Court of Justice whose case law was adumbrated by Oliver and
brought up to date most recently by Professors Casper, Bridge, and
Riesenfeld, 10
From its inception, the Court of Justice has construed the
European Economic Community Treaty in a constitutional mode
rather than employing the international law methodology of treaty
interpretation. The Treaty, the Court held, is more than an ordinary international agreement creating mutual obligations between
states parties: it created "a new legal order" in which members have
limited their sovereignty, and it conferred rights and imposed obligations, not only on the member states, but also directly on nationals of the member states which national courts must enforce.1 1
Article 189 of the Treaty mandates that Community "regulations,"
a form of legislation enacted by Community institutions, are "directly applicable" law in national courts and administrative
agencies.' 2 The Court has, however, progressively expanded the
concept of directly applicable Community law to comprise all provisions in the constitutive Treaty itself and all Community acts that
do not require further implementation by either the national or
the Community institutions, and thus are capable of being given
direct effect.13 As a consequence, the question whether an individual party is able to enforce a right derived directly from a given
Community law provision has turned increasingly on issues such
as the purpose of the provision (whether it purported to create a
"private cause of action" in addition to its regulatory purpose), on
standing to sue before the Court of Justice itself, or on the selec10 Casper, Remarks, The Emerging European Constitution, 1978 Pnoc. Am.
Sod'y INT'x. L. 169; Bridge, Remarks, The Emerging European Constitution, 1978
Poc. Am. Soc'y ITf'r. L. 176; Riesenfeld, Remarks, The Emerging European Constitution, 1978 Poc. Am. Soc'y Ir'L L. 183.
"1 Case 26/62, N.V. Allgemene Transport--en Expeditie Onderneming van
Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, [1963] E.C.R. 1. See
also Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E.C.R. 585.
12 Treaties establishing the European Communities, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 171 (1973); Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3.
1 See, e.g., P. PrScATORE, THE LAW OF INTEcHATION 92-93 (1974); E. STEN,
P. HAY & M. WAMBROEC., EURoPEAN CoMMuNrTY LAW AND INSTrrUToNs 3n
PERSPECTIVE 185-201 (1976).
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don of a proper remedy before national tribunals, which under
article 177 of the Treaty must certify questions of Community law
to the Court of Justice for a "preliminary ruling." 14 The way
the Court of Justice has defined the scope and, as we shall see below,
the effect of a "directly applicable" provision has little similarity
to Chief Justice Marshall's definition of a "self-executing" treaty
15
provision.
In a companion line of cases, reflecting at times a spirited
dialogue with the highest national tribunals, especially the Italian
Constitutional Court, the Court of Justice established the rule that
in the event of a conflict between Community law and national law,
national courts must apply Community law over prior, subsequent,
and even constitutional national law. In the latest of this group of
cases, the Court held in 1978 that an Italian court must disregard
national law conflicting with Community law as soon as it is faced
with the conflict in a case before it, and may not wait for an adjudication by the Constitutional Court as would have been required
by the Italian procedure. 16 Commenting on this latest exuberant
decision, two British constitutional experts exclaimed: "This may
be good Community Law, but I submit that it is not good British
Constitutional Law," 17 and "[T]his is exactly what our most fundamental constitutional rule forbids." 18
The European Economic Community Treaty contains no supremacy clause but the Court of Justice discovered one in the interstices of the new legal order. Moreover, the Court turned its
relatively slim jurisdictional base into a procedure approximating
appellate review of national law for conformity with Community
law. The result is reminiscent of John Marshall's combined creations in Marbury v. Madison,9 McCulloch v. Maryland,2 0 and Gibbons v. Ogden.2l
14 See note 12 supra.

15 Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet) 253 (1829).
16Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., [1978]

E.C.R. 629; for a collection of Italian comments on this case, see IL PRIATO DEL
Dnunro Co~mnTNTAo E I Gumicx ITAL.mm (F. Angeli ed. 1978).
17 Professor Hood-Phillips, quoted in Ganshoff van der Meersch, L'Arr&t dur
9 Mars 1978 de la Cour de Justice des Communaut&s Europdennes et la R&gle de
l'Application Directe du Droit Communautaire dans le Droit Interne des R8tats
Membres, 55 REvuE E DRorr INTERNATIONAL ET DE DRorr CoMPAEj [R.D.I.D.C.]
24, 39 n.55 (1978).
18 Professor Wade, quoted in Ganshoff van der Meersch, supra note 17, at 39
n.55.
195 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
20 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
2122 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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In a third line of cases of significant constitutional import, also
noted by Oliver, the Court dealt with the Community's status in
international law. International law, the Court held, is supreme
in the Community, and therefore a national court must apply a
"directly applicable" provision of a treaty between the Community
22
and a third state even if it should conflict with Community law.
Relying again not just on the text of the Treaty, but on its "esprit"
and "economie," the Court refused to limit the Community's power
to enter into international agreements with third states to instances
expressly authorized in the Treaty and proceeded to define the Community's treaty-making power as paralleling in subject matter its
internal law- and policy-making competence. 23 This definition, although aptly termed as "the exact reverse of Missouriv. Holland," 24
has had a similar effect of extending the central treaty-making
power, and it has been broadened still somewhat further in cases
handed down since Oliver's lectures.25
The extent to which judicial authorities in the member states

have accepted the Court's jurisdiction and rulings is nothing short
of remarkable, all the more so because the opinions called for important adjustments in national constitutional practice, including
the introduction of judicial review of national legislation in those
member states where it was unknown.
The exceptions to the general acceptance which Oliver describes
as "discontinuities" have until most recently proved less serious
than one might have anticipated. In the Internazionale Handelsgesellschaft 26 case that Oliver analyzes in this context, the German
Federal Constitutional Court did not reject the principle of Community law supremacy, nor did it invalidate a Community act that
the Court of Justice earlier upheld. The Constitutional Court indicated, however, with three justices dissenting, that "in an exceptional case" it may refuse enforcement of a Community law if it
finds that the law deprives an individual citizen of one of the
fundamental rights enumerated in the German Basic Law (Constitution). This position-echoed also by the Italian Constitutional
Court-is justified, the German Court explained, "by the present
joint Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Co. N.V. v. Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit, [1972] E.C.R. 1219.
23
Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the
European Communities, [1971] E.C.R. 263.
24 RBesenfeld, supra note 10, at 185.
25 See, e.g., Cases 3/76, 4/76, 6/76, In re Kramer, [1976] E.C.R. 1279.
22

•26 Internationale Handelsgesellsebaft mbH v. Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle far
Getreide und Futtermittel, 37 BVerfGE 271 (1975), [1974-2] Comm. Mkt L.R.
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state of integration of the Community." 27 At this stage, the majority opined, the Community lacks appropriate institutions for
resolving a conflict of this nature: the lawmaking is in the hands
of the executive (the Council of Ministers with the executive Commission) rather than a democratically elected parliament, and no
"codified catalogue of fundamental rights" 28 exists in the Community law.
Responding, as it were, to this reservation of national judicial
power, the Court of Justice reaffirmed the rule of an unqualified
supremacy of Community law, but indicated that it will itself protect basic individual rights as a "part of the general principles of
law," 2 9 taking account of "constitutional traditions common to the
Member States" 80 and "international treaties for the protection of
human rights on which Member States' have collaborated." 81 In a
later case, the Court of Justice referred to the European Human
Rights Convention to which all nine member states are parties as an
appropriate source, suggesting a link between the two, thus far
2
separate, aspects of the emerging European constitutional system.
The venerable and haughty French Conseil d'Etat, which in
an early notorious case refused to certify a genuine question of
Community law to the Court of Justice,33 has subsequently followed
the proper procedure, as did the courts in the other member states.
However, in a 1978 decision, the Conseil refused to give direct effect
in French law to a Community act (a "directive") which the Court
of Justice held to be self-executing despite the fact, relied upon by
the Conseil, that according to the letter of the Treaty any "directive" required implementation by national institutions.3 4 The Conseil's decision, rendered in what was essentially a moot case, constitutes the first act of open defiance of the Community Court's
authority as an umpire between Community and national power,
and a rejection of the Court's basic approach to the constitutive
Treaty. The Conseil d'Etat has added its voice to the still sporadic
but strident criticism of the Court in certain French political and
27

[1974-2] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 550.

For the Italian Constitutional Court

case, see Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze, [1974-2] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 372.
28 Id. 551.

29 Case 4/73, NoId v. Commission of the European Communities, [1974] E.C.R.

491.
30 Id. 507.
31 Id.
32 Case

36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, [1975] E.C.R. 1219.
In re Soci6t6 des P6troles Shell-Berre, [1964] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 462 (Conseil
d'Etat, France).
34
Minister of Interior v. Cohm-Bendit, No. 11604, Dec. 22, 1978.
38
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journalistic quarters, not unrelated to the electoral campaign for
the European Parliament. There is no indication thus far that the
Community Commission will want to stage a confrontation with the
French Government by making use of its authority to hold France
responsible before the Court of Justice for violating Community
law.
This brief glance at the Community's living law readily reveals-behind the veil of the indigenous nomenclature and jargondistinct federalist elements that meet the criteria suggested by Oliver
for the phenomenon of treaty-based federalism. An inquiry into
treaty-based transnational structures outside Europe, in Latin America and Africa, is beyond the confines of this gloss. Suffice it to say,
however, that none of these structures possesses a judicial tribunal
organized and functioning in a way comparable to the Court of
Justice. It is appropriate at this point to cite Oliver's own conclusion:
Further reflection shows that the strongest parallel between
successful national federations and the European "transnational" one is that in all of them judicial resolutions of
issues of federalism by the highest judicial organ of the
federation are accepted without resistance by the constituent State judicial organs. In a very real sense, the unifying force is respect for the "rule of law"-not merely in
the conventional "inter-nation" sense of adherence to pacta
sunt servanda as a basic principle of the international law
of treaties-but of something more: a sense of sharing of
normative hierarchy and of professional conditioning to
work in an organic corpus juris. One might say of the
partial federation of Europe: it exists and it functions because all the European judges involved live and work on
that assumption and the politicians do not intervene
against what the judges do. 35
C. The Caveats
This sunny view of the judicial role in Community building
and, more generally, any positive appraisal of the Community as
an incipient federal structure, calls for a series of caveats. First, the
federal-type pattern functions only in areas of the customs union,
free movement of factors of production, agriculture, aspects of social
policy, competition, harmonization of legislation and of technical
standards, and foreign commercial policy. In these areas the Com35 Oliver, supra note 1, at 394.
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munity competence is delineated in the Treaty in more or less
express terms. Beyond this, the Community organs were able,
within limits and subject to some criticism (particularly in Great
Britain), to invoke the "necessary and proper" powers in article 235
as a legal basis for expanding their legislative competence to new
fields not mentioned in the Treaty, such as environmental and consumer protection. However, the federal-type pattern has not extended to the important "second generation" problems, such as the
projected economic and monetary union, common energy, industrial research and development, and general regional policies.
These are subject to a process of difficult and protracted intergovernmental negotiations with limited results thus far. These negotiations will not become any easier with the accession of Greece, Spain,
and Portugal. The recent decision to launch a new "European
Monetary System," backed up by a multi-billion credit fund, may
prove a milestone on the road toward a common European currency,
if the governments in fact take the planned progressive steps. Although the national governments are no longer able to use a variety of traditional instruments of national economic policy, they
have been unwilling-due to domestic pressures-to transfer the
additional economic and monetary policy powers to the Community
and thus help create the necessary Community instrumentalities.
Ernst Haas, whose "spill-over" theory of integration enjoyed great
popularity in the heyday of the European unification movement,
has invented a new, equally poetic term to describe the present state
of affairs: the Community is, he writes, in a state of "asymmetric
overlap." 3(
Second, because the Community's powers are confined in principle to the economic and social sectors, other vital areas remain
within the exclusive competence of the "sovereign" member states
-and therein lies another source of tension inherent in partial integration. Foreign commercial policy, traditionally an important
tool of national foreign political policy, has come within Community
orbit; however, foreign political policy itself remains within the
exclusive competence of national authorities, subject only to voluntary consultation procedures in a system of committees of national
diplomats, organized outside the Community framework.
The last caveat concerns the role of the Court of Justice itself.
It is next to axiomatic-and the experience in the United States
provides ample supportive evidence-that if a federal tribunal arrogates to itself judicial authority to define the line between federal
36
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and state power on the basis of more or less general constitutional
language, it will invariably incline toward increasing the reach of the
federation, with a concomitant increment in its own authority.
This, as we have seen, has been happening-mutatis mutandis-in
the Community as well. The critics of the Court have articulated
two related concerns. First, it has been said that "in less than
twenty years, the constitutionalization of European Community law
has led to the point where, as in the United States, the supremacy
of law seems to mean the supremacy of judges" with the "specter of
substantive due process" looming over the Community and the
"judges using very vague and general provisions to make policy decisions of great magnitude according to their own preference." 37 In
fact, although as Oliver points out, the Court did assert its power
to apply "principles" such as "reasonableness" (or "proportionality"
or "equality") in adjudicating the compatibility of Community regulations with the constitutive Treaty, it has used this power sparingly;
the number of Community legislative acts struck down as invalid
has been minimal, and they were of little long-term importance.
It cannot be seriously argued that the Court has thwarted or challenged the Community legislator. Of greater impact in this respect were the Court's rulings bearing upon the validity of member
states legislation and curtailing the competence of the member
states, particularly in the fields of trade and marketing regulation,
foreign relations, and sex discrimination in employment. In my
judgment, however, the record is far from one justifying alarm. A
more legitimate concern than judicial activism is the current slowdown in the integration process. The Court has constructed, as we
have seen, a bold, over-arching doctrine which provides an effective
base for a federal-type structure. On the other hand, the legislative
process of shaping common policies from divergent national policies
has not progressed significantly beyond the customs-union/commonmarket state. If anything, national economic policies in this decade
have been drifting even further apart, thus blocking progress toward an economic unity. It is this contradiction that raises a legitimate apprehension that the Court may assume an excessive role in
solving questions requiring political solutions, and that it may attempt to carry forward the process of integration beyond the basic
political consensus on which its legitimacy depends. If the Community institutions were to be completed in the federal pattern,
common policy decisions would logically be made in the European
Parliament. That body, however, plays today only an advisory role
37 Casper, supra note 10, at 175.
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in Community lawmaking, and the plan for direct elections by
universal suffrage scheduled for June, 1979, does not contemplate
a change in its formal powers. A lively debate has centered on the
question whether the elected Parliament will succeed in increasing
its authority in fact, if not in law. The very fact that the major
political parties have been organizing and campaigning at the
"European" level is of historic political significance.
The European federalism will remain "incipient"-and the
integration partial-for some time to come, with no certainty whatsoever as to the ultimate form of transnational governance in
Europe. Surely the accession of the three additional members,
Greece, Spain, and Portugal, with different legal systems and relatively low levels of economic development, will not make things
easier.
The events in the five years since Oliver completed his lectures
confirm that where he chose to read the tea leaves of the institutional evolution in Europe, he read them well. It is my fervent
hope that he will continue reading them in good health and with
equal perspicacity for many years to come.

